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Introduction
Many social commentators today suggest that a second great age of philanthropy is upon us. Some of the world's wealthiest individuals, such as Bill Gates and George Soros, contribute vast sums to good causes, mimicking the philanthropic behavior of the Carnegies, Mellons and Rockefellers of the nineteenth century. Such trends are of course not con…ned to America-for example the Scottish entrepreneur Sir Tom Hunter announced in 2007 his intention to redirect over £1bn of his personal fortune into charitable projects worldwide. At the same time, similar initiatives towards good causes are now well established among corporate donors. Two well known charitable drives led by corporates are the Livestrong and Red campaigns. The Livestrong campaign, a partnership between Nike and the Lance Armstrong Foundation and Endowment, raised over $50 million in 2009, with $5 million coming from merchandise sales including the famous yellow wristbands.
Since its inception in 2006, Product Red campaign has raised over $150 million for the Global Fund to help eliminate AIDS in Africa through events and the sale of Red products by corporations such as Gap and Apple.
Despite vast sums being given by philanthropic and corporate donors, the bulk of the economics literature on charitable giving has focused on the determinants of why and how individuals give. 1 Far less attention has been given to the charitable behavior of other donor types, such as corporates or aristocrats-namely those with some formal title such as Earl or Baron and who might therefore be from a family dynasty with a history of philanthropy. This paper presents evidence from a large-scale natural …eld experiment designed to shed light on how corporates, aristocrats, and individuals, di¤er in their response to the same fundraising scheme. We provide some …rst tentative evidence to help understand whether and how each recipient type responds to commonly used methods in fundraising, such as the presence of lead donors and donations being matched at some rate. In doing so, we address new questions of how charitable organizations might design and target fundraising activities to harness funds from corporate and aristocratic donors.
Information about aggregate donations from aristocrats is scarce. However, to motivate our analysis and to get a wider sense of the importance of corporate giving, we collected evidence from Forbes' 'America's 200 Largest Charities' list, as ranked by the value of private donations to them, published in 2005. The most recent publicly available balance sheets were examined for 199 of the 200 charities included in the list. 2 It was possible to collect detailed information on the sources of funds for 20 of these 199 charities. In particular, the …nancial statements of these 20 charities allow us to break down sources of funding into the following types: (i) government/not-for-pro…t organizations; (ii) corporations; (iii) individuals. To understand whether funding sources di¤er by the nature of work conducted by the charitable organization, we classify charities as operating in one of the following sectors: (i) humanitarian relief; (ii) medical; (iii) environment; (iv) arts and culture; (v) education.
3 Table 1 summarizes the data on funding sources by charitable organization type. All three sources of funding: government, corporate and individual, are important across charitable sectors.
In line with the evidence presented by Andreoni [2006] , we see that on average, 30% of all donations across charitable sectors originate from corporates. The last row shows that government and individual donations represent 25% and 34% respectively of all donations. In arts and culture (the charitable sector most relevant to the …eld experiment discussed below), corporate donations correspond to 20% of all donations, a higher percentage than in other charitable sectors such as the environment or education. As Column 6 makes clear, corporate donations are more signi…cant relative to individual donations for charities in the medical and education sectors. While any …gures based on this selected sample of charities is of course subject to many caveats, they nonetheless suggest the importance of studying giving behavior of donors other than individuals, that have been the focus of much of the literature on philanthropy in economics. It is in this direction that our paper contributes by providing some tentative new evidence from a natural …eld experiment.
More precisely, in conjunction with the Bavarian State Opera in Munich, in June 2006, we mailed 25,000 recipients-including corporates, aristocrats, and regular opera attendees (whom we label 'individuals')-a letter describing a charitable fundraising project organized by the opera house. All recipient types in our study are recorded to have previously purchased tickets from the opera house. Corporates might have purchased tickets for employees or clients. The aristocrats in our study are all recorded in the opera's database as having a formal title of some sort, such as Baron, Baroness, Earl and so forth. In the German context, such aristocratic families are likely to have a long philanthropic association with the arts. 4 Recipients were randomly assigned to mail out treatments that varied in two dimensions: (i) whether information was conveyed about the existence of an anonymous lead donor; (ii) how individual donations would be matched by the anonymous lead donor. The …eld experiment sheds light on how each recipient type responds to the presence of lead donors and the relative price of giving. We do so for both the extensive margin of giving (whether any positive donation is made) and the intensive margin (how much is donated conditional on a donation being made). The behavioral response of individual donors to the …eld experiment is analyzed in more detail However overall our results indicate that the use of …eld experiments-that are now widely used to understand charitable giving more broadly-remain a useful tool to answer questions related to even a small fraction of potential donors such as corporates and aristocrats, especially when such donor types contribute disproportionately large amounts in aggregate, to charitable causes. The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the …eld experiment.
Section 3 presents the main results on the intensive and extensive margins of charitable giving. Section 4 concludes with a broader discussion on the hurdles to be overcome for future studies that aim to shed light on the philanthropic behavior of corporates and elites.
The Natural Field Experiment
In June 2006 the Bavarian State Opera organized a mail out of 25,000 letters designed to elicit donations for a social youth project the opera was engaged in, "Stück für Stück". The mail out recipients were randomly selected from the opera's database of customers who had purchased at least one ticket in the twelve months prior to the mail out. Recipients could correspond to corporates, aristocratically titled individuals such as Barons and Earls, or to non-titled individuals.
Recipients were randomly assigned to one of four treatments that varied in two dimensions: (i) whether information was conveyed about the existence of an anonymous lead donor; (ii) how individual donations would be matched by the anonymous lead donor. The mail-out letters were identical in all treatments with the exception of one paragraph. The Appendix shows the format and wording of the mail out. The control treatment (T1) was such that recipients were provided no information about the existence of a lead donor, and o¤ered no commitment to match individual donations. The wording of the key paragraph in the letter read as follows,
This is why I would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation.
This paragraph is manipulated in the other treatments. In the second treatment (T2) recipients were informed that the project had already garnered a lead gift of 60,000. The corresponding paragraph read as follows, T2 (Lead Donor): A generous donor who prefers not to be named has already been enlisted. He will support "Stück für Stück" with 60,000. Unfortunately, this is not enough to fund the project completely which is why I would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation.
The control and lead donor treatments di¤er only in that in the latter recipients are informed of the presence of a lead donor. There is no o¤er to match donations in any way in either treatment.
Such substantial lead donations might a¤ect the giving behavior of others because they eliminate an equilibrium in which all donations are zero [Andreoni 1998 ], they act as a signal of project quality [Vesterlund 2003 ], or because of a snob appeal e¤ect that makes individual contributions increase in the contributions of others [Romano and Yildirim 2001] . These models provide less clear-cut predictions on how the various types of potential donors we study-individuals, aristocrats and corporates-might di¤erentially react to such lead gifts. Our discussion above suggests that if corporates are found to be responsive to the presence of a lead donor, this is in line with managers choosing the pro…t-maximizing level of corporate donations.
The third class of treatments all provide recipients information on the existence of the lead donor but vary the relative price of giving in some way. To preserve adequate sample sizes in each donor type-treatment cell, we bundle together three di¤erent matching treatments. In the …rst, donations are matched by the anonymous lead donor at a 50% rate (so that giving one Euro would correspond to the opera receiving 1.50), in the second a 100% rate if o¤ered, and in the third a 100% match rate is o¤ered conditional on the donation being above 50. For the 50% match rate o¤er, the corresponding paragraph in the mail out letter read as follows, 7 7 The 100% match rate o¤er was analogously worded. The treatment where the 100% match was conditional on the donation being at least 50 was explained as follows: "A generous donor who prefers not to be named has already been enlisted. He will support "Stück für Stück" with up to 60,000 by donating, for each donation above 50 that we receive within the next four weeks, the same amount himself. In light of this unique opportunity I T3 (Matching): A generous donor who prefers not to be named has already been enlisted. He will support "Stück für Stück" with up to 60,000 by donating, for each Euro that we receive within the next four weeks, another 50 Euro cent. In light of this unique opportunity I would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation.
The …nal treatment (T4) o¤ered recipients a …xed positive match of 20 for any positive donation. We refer to this as the 'income' treatment because conditional on making any positive donation it is as if the donor receives a lump sum transfer of 20. This treatment was explained in the mail out letter as follows, T4 (Income): A generous donor who prefers not to be named has already been enlisted. He will support "Stück für Stück" with up to 60,000 by donating, for each donation that we receive within the next four weeks regardless of the donation amount, another 20. In light of this unique opportunity I would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation.
This treatment allows us to bound the share of each recipient type for whom, the marginal utility of even contributing a small amount is close to zero and are therefore unlikely to donate under any realistic circumstances given any small transactions costs of donating.
As discussed in Huck and Rasul [2010] , four further points are of note. First, the opera had no fundraising target in mind, nor was any target discussed in the mail out. Funds raised for the project were used to …nance a series of small events, as made clear in the mail out letter. Hence recipients know that marginal contributions will make a di¤erence. Second, recipients were told the matching schemes would be in place for four weeks, with over 95% recipients that donated, doing so in this time frame. Third, recipients are told the truth-the lead gift was actually provided and each matching scheme was implemented. The value of matches was capped at 60,000 which ensured recipients were told the truth even if the campaign was more successful than anticipated. Finally, the project's bene…ciaries are children from disadvantaged families whose parents are almost surely not among the recipients of the mail out. Hence the fundraising campaign relates to a project that conveys no immediate bene…ts to potential donors, ensuring there is no role for gift exchange or reciprocity in driving donations, as in Falk [2007] . As donors are not publicly announced, there is no role for social recognition to drive behavior, that might plausibly di¤er across the types of donor considered.
Results

Recipient Characteristics
The original mail out was sent to 25,000 recipients on the opera house's customer database. After removing missing values and extreme outliers, our working sample is based on mail-outs sent to would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation."
22,318 individual recipients, 362 corporates and 53 aristocrats, as shown in Column 1 of Table  2 . 8 Aristocratic recipients are so called because each has a formal title of some sort. Our sample includes recipients with the following titles: Baron/Baronin (Freiherr/Freifrau), and Graf/Grä…n-which is a historical German noble title similar in rank to a count or a British earl. In the German context, we might expect such elites to have long philanthropic associations with arts and culture. 9 The remaining columns provide information on recipients' opera attendance. 10 Individual recipients purchase around six tickets in the year prior to the mail out in two separate orders. The average price per ticket is around 87 with the annual total spent on attendance averaging 410.
Clearly, these individuals are not representative of the population. Our analysis therefore sheds light on how the behavior of elites and corporates di¤ers from such selected individuals. To the extent that other organizations target charitable projects towards those with high a¢nity to the organization as well as those who are likely to have high income, the results have external validity in other settings.
Comparing individual and corporate recipients, Table 2 reveals that: (i) corporates purchase signi…cantly more tickets, although place the same number of orders over the year prior to the mail-out; (ii) corporates spend signi…cantly more per ticket. As a result, corporates spend almost …ve times as much on opera tickets as do individuals. Comparing individuals and aristocrats, Table 2 reveals there are no observable di¤erences between the two. While aristocrats spend an average of 10 more per ticket than individuals, this is not a signi…cant di¤erence. Hence at least in terms of these proxies of a¢nity to the opera, aristocratic recipients do not much di¤er from individual recipients. Table 3 provides evidence on the observable characteristics of donors and non-donors for each recipient type. We report the mean and standard error of each characteristic, as well as the -value on the null hypothesis that the characteristic is the same among donors and non-donors of the same recipient type. As documented in Huck et al. [2013] , the response rate, averaged across treatments is 4.1% among individual recipients. Comparing individual donors and non-donors, donors purchase signi…cantly more tickets in the year prior to the mail out, place more separate orders over the same time period, and are signi…cantly more likely to have last attended the opera recently. In contrast, the average price per ticket does not di¤er signi…cantly between individual donors and non-donors. These results suggest that a¢nity to the opera house-as measured by 8 We had to exclude some observations due to missing values in the variables used anywhere in the analysis. We also exclude non-Germans, and individual recipients for which no gender can be assigned. Additionally, we excluded a small number of observations that were extreme outliers in terms of donations given, de…ned as those that gave more than four standard deviations more than the mean in the same treatment-recipient type cell. 9 On corporates we cannot reveal further information except that 45% are registered in Munich zip codes. In comparison, 46% (49%) of individual (titled) recipients reside in Munich. 10 Given random assignment, there are insigni…cant di¤erences on observables across treatments by recipient type.
Who Donates?
the number of ticket purchases, separate ticket orders, and time of last attendance-is strongly correlated to the behavior of individuals along the extensive margin of whether to donate or not. In contrast, characteristics that more closely proxy individual income are less correlated with whether the individual responds to the mail out.
Comparing across recipient types, we see that although corporates and individuals have similar response rates to each other, a remarkable 13% of aristocratic recipients donate to the fundraising project. We know of no other study-even highly targeted campaigns-in which such high response rates to a charitable fundraising drive have been generated. For corporates, there are no signi…cant di¤erences on observables between donors and non-donors, except that donors order more tickets than non-donors. Similarly for aristocratic recipients, on observables there are no signi…cant di¤erences between aristocratic donors and non-donors, except that donors are signi…cantly more likely to have purchased a ticket recently. Hence, from the perspective of the charitable organization, the results show that it is relatively easy to predict which individuals are most likely to respond to fundraising drives-namely those with more a¢nity to the opera house. However, making similar predictions among corporates and aristocrats is harder, because unobservables largely drive behavior on the extensive margin of giving. Table 4 provides evidence on donations given and received by recipient type and treatment. The donation given relates to amount donated by the donor, and the donation received includes the value of the match, that is relevant for treatments T3 and T4. Given the small number of aristocrats that donate in the sample, we avoid making any claims about the giving behavior of such recipients beyond what has already been noted on the extensive margin of giving. This is an inevitable drawback of trying to study the behavior of a small, albeit important, group of potential donors. Hence in Table 4 we focus the discussion on comparing individual to corporate donors.
Giving Behavior
We see that response rates do not signi…cantly di¤er between treatments T1 and T2 while there is a signi…cant increase from T2 to T3 (which, however, disappears when T2 is compared to the di¤erent types of matching schemes aggregated here in T3, see Huck and Rasul [2010] for details). Comparing individual response rates between T2 and T4, we see that a pure income transfer in T4 induces signi…cantly more individuals to give, as expected.
Column 3 shows that in the control treatment T1, the average donation given by individuals is 74.2. In the lead donor treatment T2, this rises signi…cantly to 133. The near doubling of donations given can only be a response to the presence of a lead donor. Combining this with the previous result on response rates, we note that while such lead donors do not induce new individual donors to enter, recipients who like the project to begin with like it even more when they observe that somebody else is already strongly committed to it.
As the relative price of donations received falls moving from treatment T2 to the linear match-ing treatments in T3, the average donation received from individuals (including the match) rises from 133 to 174. As the match rate increases, donations given by individuals fall indicating some crowding out. Comparing outcomes from the income matching scheme T4 to the lead donor treatment T2, we see that average donations given fall from 133 to 67.9. Combining this with the previous result that response rates signi…cantly rise moving from T2 to T4, it becomes apparent that the additional individuals that are induced in T4 relative to T2 are those with low willingness to pay. This issue is explored further in Huck et al. [2015] that focuses exclusively on the behavior of individual recipients.
Comparing donations across treatments, we …nd signi…cant di¤erences in the donations given. Hence we can rule out that individual preferences can be characterized by pure warm glow so they only care about the donation given rather than that actually received, irrespective of the match rate faced. Similarly we …nd signi…cant di¤erences across treatments in the amounts received by the project, including the match. Hence we can also rule out that individual recipients are engaged in pure donation targeting, where individuals choose to give an amount so that the project always receives the same amount, irrespective of the match rate. In terms of e¤ectiveness, Columns 5 and 6 show the return per mailed letter which highlights again the superiority of the treatment with a lead donor who makes an unconditional contribution (T2). Of course, if the lead donor insists on matching, this still beats the baseline without any kind of lead gift.
Comparing across recipient types, we do not …nd systematic di¤erences in the extensive margins between individual and corporate donors. Column 2 shows that response rates among corporate recipients do not signi…cantly vary with the exception of a borderline signi…cant fall in reaction to proportional matching (comparing T2 to T3).
Turning to the intensive margins for corporate donors in Columns 7, 8, 9 , and 10, we …rst note that they give signi…cantly more than individuals in all treatments. While perhaps unsurprising, it is still an important result for practical purposes. Corporate donors should receive extra attention from fundraisers if they can be identi…ed as such. Comparing the giving behavior of corporate donors in T2 and T3, Columns 7 and 8 show that corporates, too, reduce their average donations once matching kicks in. However, contrary to individuals this reduction is at best borderline signi…cant (for a one-tailed version of the reported test). Comparing corporate behavior in T2 to T4 we …nd for corporate donors display much less of a reaction to pure income transfers. In terms of e¤ectiveness, our two borderline signi…cant …ndings for corporates (a lower response rate and smaller donations given in response to proportional matching) reinforce each other and render T2 with an expected donation of 11.70 vastly more e¤ective per letter sent than T3 which has a meagerly expected donation of 2.05.
11 11 We refrain from comparisons with the control treatment as there is just one very large donation there. responds to the presence of large lead donors, and the relative price of giving. We …nd that aristocratic donors are signi…cantly more responsive to the same charitable drive than other donor types and that corporates give signi…cantly larger amounts. Both, are precious for the fundraiser.
Regarding corporate response to the presence of a lead donor and to matching our results are ambiguous. While point estimates indicate that corporate donations are similarly price elastic as individual ones the resulting crowding out is only borderline signi…cant. However, coupled with a reduction in the response rate which also borders on signi…cance we …nd that proportional matching vastly reduces the e¤ectiveness of the fundraising drive for corporates.
While adverse e¤ects of matching are also present for individuals and have been documented before in Huck and Rasul [2010] and Huck et al.
[2015] the e¤ect we observe for corporates is even more dramatic and suggests that, even if fundraisers might be forced by competition or indeed their lead donors to rely on proportional matching schemes, they may want to target corporates separately. Corporate donors are a valuable source for the fundraiser and may require (and deserve) special treatment.
Moving forward, an Achilles heel for this type of research question will remain the relatively small number of corporate and aristocratic donors to any charitable organization, even if these types of donors contribute a relatively large share of all donations received. For example, since the Bavarian State Opera started "small money" fundraising through unsolicited letters in 2006 they have raised a little over half a million Euros through such drives. On the other hand, they earn about 3 million euros per year through large donations from corporates and wealthy donors. Hence although we see a role for research designs based on experimental methods to establish causal determinants of giving of di¤erent types of potential donor, we envisage future work might also encompass the use of qualitative interviews with these types of scarce donor, for example.
Here we focus on aristocrats and corporates as we can identify these two groups from the data we have. More generally, one might want to study wealthy donors and those that have traditions of philanthropic activities such as large parts of, say, the "East coast aristocracy", wealthy "old-money" families who have engaged in giving for generations. To that extent, our research into titled donors also has relevance for countries that have abolished formal aristocratic titles.
Despite the obvious challenges, given the growth in wealth (and giving) of corporates and the very wealthy, an agenda to explore their motives and decision rules remains worth pursuing, both, from the fundraiser's as well as from the economist's point of view. Table 1 is based on the subsample composed by these 20 charities.The sum of the entries in columns (2) to (4) is less than the corresponding entry in column (1) The Bavarian State Opera House has been investing in the musical education of children and youths for several years now as the operatic the art form is in increasing danger of disappearing from the cultural memory of future generations.
Enthusiasm for music and opera is awakened in many different ways in our children and youth programme, "Erlebnis Oper" [Experience Opera]. In the forthcoming season 2006/7 we will enlarge the scope of this programme through a new project "Stück für Stück" that specifically invites children from schools in socially disadvantaged areas to a playful introduction into the world of opera. Since we have extremely limited own funds for this project, the school children will only be able to experience the value of opera with the help of private donations.
[This paragraph describes each matching scheme and is experimentally varied as described in the main text of the paper].
As a thank you we will give away a pair of opera tickets for Engelbert Humperdinck's "Konigskinder" on Wednesday, 12 July 2006 in the music director's box as well as fifty CDs signed by Maestro Zubin Mehta among all donors.
You can find all further information in the enclosed material. In case of any questions please give our Development team a ring on [phone number]. I would be very pleased if we could enable the project "Stück für Stück" through this appeal and, thus, make sure that the operatic experience is preserved for younger generations.
With many thanks for your support and best wishes, Sir Peter Jonas, Staatsintendant
"Stück für Stück"
The project "Stück für Stück" has been developed specifically for school children from socially disadvantaged areas. Musical education serves many different functions in particular for children and youths with difficult backgrounds --it strengthens social competence and own personality, improves children's willingness to perform, and reduces social inequality. Since music education plays a lesser and lesser role in home and school education, the Bavarian State Opera has taken it on to contribute to it ourselves. The world of opera as a place of fascination is made attainable and accessible for young people.
In drama and music workshops, "Stück für Stück" will give insights into the world of opera for groups of around 30 children. They will be intensively and creatively prepared for a subsequent visit of an opera performance. These workshops encourage sensual perception -through ear and eye but also through scenic and physical play and intellectual comprehension -all of these are important elements for the workshops. How does Orpheus in "Orphee and Eurydice" manage to persuade the gods to let him save his wife from the realm of dead? Why does he fail? Why poses the opera "Cosi fan tutte" that girls can never be faithful? It is questions like these that are investigated on the workshops.
The workshops are also made special through the large number and variety of people who are involved in them: musicians, singers, directors, and people from many other departments, ranging from costumes and makeup to marketing. The participants in each workshop work through an opera's storyline, and are introduced to the production and will meet singers in their costumes as well as musicians. This makes the workshops authentic. After the workshops the participants are invited to see the actual opera production.
Through your donation the project "Stück für Stück" will be made financially viable so that we can charge only a small symbolic fee to the participants. This makes it possible to offer our children and youth programme also to children from socially disadvantaged backgrounds that can, thus, learn about the fascination of opera.
Note: In German, Stück für Stück is a wordplay ---"Stück" meaning "play" as in drama and "Stück für Stück" being an expression for doing something bit by bit.
